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[Abstract] Implementation of the European internal market and East-West integration has 
been accompanied by a dramatic change in the spatial distribution of economic activity, with 
higher growth west and east of a longitude degree through Germany and Italy. In the east, 
income growth has been accompanied by increasing regional disparities within countries. 
We examine theoretically and empirically whether European integration as such can explain 
these developments. Using a numerical simulation model with 9 countries and 90 regions, 
theoretical predictions are derived about how various patterns of integration may affect the 
income distribution. Comparing with reality, we ﬁnd that a reduction in distance-related trade 
costs combined with east-west integration is best able to explain the actual changes in Eu-
rope’s economic geography. This suggests that the implementation of the European internal 
market or the Euro has “made Europe smaller”. In Central Europe, the dominance of capital 
regions tends to eliminate east-west growth differences inside countries. There is no convinc-
ing support for the hypothesis that European integration had adverse effects on non-members. 
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1. Introduction* 
 
Since the fall of the iron curtain, Europe has been subject to a number of 
profound reforms and changes. During the early 1990s, the European in-
ternal market was established, and the process of East-West European in-
tegration started – eventually leading up to the recent enlargement of the 
EU in 2004 and 2007. From integration within a club of rich countries in 
Western Europe during the 1960’s and 1970’s, integration has expanded to 
the south and east. The implementation of reforms takes time and Europe 
is still in a period of change. Nevertheless, almost two decades have 
passed since the process started and we now have data to examine whether 
the reforms have caused dramatic changes in the economic landscape of 
Europe.  
 In the former “rich man’s club”, there was a belt of agglomeration, 
popularised in the concept of the so-called “blue banana” stretching from 
London to Milano (Brunet 2002). This pattern of agglomeration mainly 
survived the enlargement of the EEC from 6 to 15 members. During the 
period before 1990, enlargement to the south contributed to economic 
convergence across countries, and little change – or modest increase – in 
regional disparities within countries (see e.g. Combes and Overman 2005, 
Cappelen et al. 1999, and also Ben David 1996).  For the post-1990 period, 
recent evidence similarly suggests that there has been convergence across 
countries in the wider Europe, but regional inequality has increased con-
siderably in new member states (see e.g. World Bank 2000, Römisch 
2003, Landesmann and Römisch 2006, Melchior 2008a). 
A better understanding of regional dynamics is urgent not only for 
those affected but also for policy: regional support constitutes a main 
component of the common policies of the European Union. Some research 
suggests that EU regional policies are effective in some cases but not al-
ways (see e.g. Ederveen et al. 2006). According to Baldrin and Canova 
(2001), these policies mainly have a redistributive role with little impact 
on growth. For understanding when such policies are effective and when 
they are not, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of regional change as 
well as the impact of other policies. In particular, we should understand the 
impact of integration itself: Does European integration as such contribute 
to regional convergence or more disparities? In the light of growing re-
gional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe, the issue is even more 
“burning”. In the context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy (see e.g. Dodini 
and Fantini 2006), an urgent issue is whether there is an “agglomeration 
shadow” whereby regions outside the enlarged EU are worse off.  
As argued by Puga (1999, 2002), new theories of industrial loca-
tion may add to this understanding, and this paper represents an effort to 
                                                 
* I thank Per Botolf Maurseth and Fredrik Wilhelmsson for useful comments to an earlier 
draft. Financial support from the EU 6th Framework Programme and the Norwegian Re-
search Council is gratefully acknowledged. Data were collected as part of the ENEPO 
(European Eastern Neighbourhood – Economic Potential and Future Development) pro-
ject and I thank Fredrik Wilhelmsson and Linda Skjold Oksnes for their participation in 
this. I thank colleagues at CEFIR/ Moscow and Kyiv School of Economics for their as-
sistance in providing data for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, and Cesar de Diego Diez 
at Eurostat/GISCO for supplying geodata for NUTS 3 regions. 
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add to our knowledge about integration and the economic geography of 
Europe.  The purpose of this paper is to examine how European integration 
has affected the income distribution across countries and regions. We start 
by showing that there has recently been a sharp change along Europe’s 
East-West axis; with higher growth to the east and west of a longitude de-
gree passing through Italy and Germany. The further away from this lon-
gitude, the higher is regional growth. During the period covered, there is a 
gradual switch from western growth (Ireland, Portugal, Spain) to eastern 
growth (in the new EU member states). As an attempt to understand this 
development, we use a large-scale numerical simulation model as a basis 
for econometric analysis. We show that in Western-Europe, the east-west 
gradient of growth differences applies within countries as well as between 
them. In Central Europe, however, capital regions dominate and wipe out 
the east-west growth differences within countries, so here the east-west 
growth pattern (with higher growth in the east) is driven by differences 
across countries. Comparing to results from the simulation model, we ten-
tatively conclude that in Western Europe, this development is driven by 
reductions in the “cost of distance” due to the EU internal market. In Cen-
tral Europe, the impact of wider European integration dominates; jointly 
with transition that may explain the dominating role of capital regions. For 
Eastern Europe, we do not find evidence confirming the presence of an 
“agglomeration shadow”.  
In the new economic geography literature, numerical simulation 
models with many regions have been used for theoretical purposes.  Fujita 
et.al. (1999, Chapter 18) analyse patterns of agglomeration across regions 
spread out along the circumference of a circle and show that lower trade 
costs can lead to fewer and larger agglomerations. Venables (1999) ex-
amine the location of different industries in a setting with many regions on 
a circular plain. Approaching the real-world economic geography in 
Europe, Stelder (2005) uses a large-scale simulation model in order to 
study the location of cities in Europe. In the current paper, we use a styl-
ised model with a two-dimensional space (a rectangular plain) in the theo-
retical part in order to capture some features of the European landscape. 
Based on this we derive predictions and hypotheses for empirical analysis, 
and then revert to the model in the light of the empirical findings. We do 
however not attempt to construct a numerically realistic or calibrated 
model fitted to actual data. Hence the simulation model used is for theo-
retical purposes and not a computable equilibrium (CGE) approach, as in 
e.g. Bröcker and Schneider (2002). In the paper, we attempt to develop 
“geographical economics”, by using quasi-realistic numerical modelling in 
order to understand true spatial effects. The purpose of the theory is not to 
derive universal predictions, e.g. that “globalisation promotes regional 
inequality” or the like. We maintain that such universal predictions do not 
exist; the effects depend on the specific reforms undertaken as well as the 
initial income distribution.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, a descriptive account 
of economic growth patterns in Europe is presented, using data at the re-
gional level for 1995-2005 covering 29 countries and 1410 regions. In 
Section 3, we explain the numerical simulation model with nine countries 
and 90 regions that is used in order to derive predictions about spatial 
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change. We then compare different scenarios with actual empirical trends 
and draw tentative conclusions about the forces driving the substantial 
changes in Europe’s economic geography. In section 4, we analyse empiri-
cally whether the observed east-west pattern of growth differentials is 
driven mainly by differences across countries, or whether it is also re-
flected across regions within countries (as suggested by the numerical 
simulation model). In this way, we arrive at tentative but nevertheless 
relatively clear conclusions about the driving forces behind the changes in 
Europe’s economic geography. In section 5, we revert to the theoretical 
model and show a revised scenario which is close to the observed pattern. 
In section 6, we sum up some of the results and present some concluding 
comments as well as ideas for future research. 
 
2. The economic geography of Europe: Major changes 1995-2005 
 
In Melchior (2008a), trends in within-country regional inequality are ana-
lysed using a similar but extended data set. Based on this study, Figure 1 
summarises some results for the EU-27 plus Croatia, Norway and 
Ukraine.1 Darker colour indicates a higher increase in domestic regional 
inequality. For the brightest areas (except white=missing), there was little 
change or even some reduction in domestic regional inequality. The dia-
gram is based on population-weighted Gini coefficients for domestic re-
gional inequality during 1995-2005. Using annual estimates for the Ginis, 
a predicted trend over time has been derived for each country by means of 
regression analysis.2 The results from this are shown in the diagram. 
                                                 
1 Denmark and Switzerland are missing and therefore white areas.  
2 By using this method, we also correct for variations in the number of years covered for 
each country, cf. Appendix Table A1. In Figure 1, Russia is not included due to limita-
tions in the map data available (using the SAS system version 9.1.3).  
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Figure 1: Changes in domestic regional inequality in Europe, 1995-2005. 
 
In the whole eastern part and with no exceptions among the countries cov-
ered, there was a substantial increase in regional disparities. In the central 
areas from Italy to Norway, there was little change or even some reduction 
in regional inequality. Moving westward, we find modest changes but 
some increase in e.g. the UK and Ireland. These changes in regional ine-
quality are correlated with income levels as well as growth: Relatively 
poor countries had faster growth but also increasing regional inequality. At 
the European level, income convergence across countries is quantitatively 
more important than income divergence within some countries. On the 
whole, therefore, there was income convergence in Europe (ibid.).  
 This is the point of departure for the analysis to be undertaken here. 
Given our interest in the impact of east-west integration, we are particu-
larly interested in the spatial east-west dimension of European economic 
development. In addition, we focus on the interaction between interna-
tional changes (between countries) and regional changes within countries: 
How does international integration affect domestic regions? 
 In the economic growth literature, the North-South dimension has 
sometimes been explored, e.g. with the underlying motivation that climatic 
differences may affect growth. On such grounds, latitudes have been used 
as explanatory variables in the analysis (see e.g. Rodrigues-Pose and 
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Telios 2008 for a recent contribution using latitudes, focusing on Western 
European regions). In our analysis, we will also include latitudes, since we 
are interested in tracing spatial patterns of change generally. However our 
core focus will be on the east-west aspect and therefore longitudes.  
 In the empirical analysis, we use regional data on real GDP and 
population for 28 countries: 23 countries among EU-27 (Denmark, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta are dropped due to missing data or limited 
regional subdivisions), plus Norway, Croatia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Information about data and sources is provided in Appendix A. In parts of 
the analysis, we also report results where Germany is split into East and 
West. In order to obtain a more detailed spatial subdivision, and in order to 
have a sufficiently large number of regions in the smaller countries, we 
mostly use regional data at the more detailed NUTS 3 classification level.  
The data set therefore contains 1410 regions.  
 For all countries except Russia and Ukraine, we use income data in 
purchasing power parities (PPPs) and constant prices, so figures are com-
parable across countries and over time. Observe, however, that PPPs are 
national and not regional, so income comparisons across regions within a 
country may be biased to the extent that price levels or inflation rates dif-
fer across regions within this country. This also applies to the non-PPP 
countries Russia and Ukraine. For Russia, inflation rates may differ sub-
stantially across regions and the lack of satisfactory regional price data is a 
limitation (Gluschenko 2006, see also Melchior 2008a). Given the large 
number of countries covered by the analysis here we do not attempt to 
correct for within-country differences in price levels or inflation rates, but 
leave this as a task for future research.  
 Data on income and population are supplemented with data on lati-
tude and longitude for each region. For NUTS 3 regions, we use coordi-
nates for centre points used by Eurostat for labelling maps.3  For Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine we use coordinates for regional administrative centres 
from the Geocities database.  
Figure 2 shows income averages in 1995 and 2005 for all regions at 
each longitude degree, for 1204 regions in our sample (excluding Croatia, 
Russia, Turkey and Ukraine due to limited time series or lack of compara-
ble income data).4  
 
                                                 
3 For explanation of the NUTS classification of regions, see Eurostat (2007). 
4 For some countries with a shorter time span covered (Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Roma-
nia) the first year covered differs from 1995. 
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Figure 2: Average income levels in EU-27/EEA regions by longitude, 1995 
and 2005
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In order to facilitate the interpretation of the graph, Figure A1 in the Ap-
pendix shows the range of longitudes spanned by the regions of each 
country in the graph.5 To the far west we find Portugal, Ireland, Spain and 
then the UK. At the centre we find e.g. Western Germany (longitude range 
9.4-13.5), Italy (12.2-18.1) and others. Estonia, Finland, Bulgaria and 
Romania are located furthest east.  
 In both periods, there is a distinct W-shaped distribution, with peak 
income levels in the central areas with longitudes around 8-10. Comparing 
levels in the two periods, we observe that absolute increases are slightly 
larger in the western half of the diagram. The relative increase is however 
larger towards the east. In order to see this more clearly, Figure 3 shows 
average annual growth rates by longitude, using the same data set.  
 
                                                 
5 We use centre point for regions so regional border areas are not covered. 
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Figure 3: Per capita income growth rate averages
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Now the W is inverted, approaching an M. The pattern of growth differen-
tials is quite characteristic, especially in the mid-range where a sharp V is 
present. Hence the pattern of growth differences across European regions 
has an easily discernible and distinct spatial dimension during the period. 
Observe that this applies to the east-west dimension – a similar pattern is 
not present in the North-South direction. 
 Comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is evident that there is an inverse 
relationship between initial income and growth. Melchior (2008a, Appen-
dix E) presents simple growth regressions that confirm the trend towards 
convergence. The analysis also shows that growth in eastern EU-27 coun-
tries was higher and European convergence more pronounced after 2000. 
In order to check how this affects the pattern above, we split the period 
into two halves; shown in Figures 4a (1995-2000) and 4b (2000-2005).  
 
Figure 4a: 1995-2000
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Figure 4b: 2000-2005
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In the most recent period, growth in Western Europe was slower and 
growth in Central/Eastern Europe higher. For 2000-2005, the pattern ap-
proaches a U-shape with higher growth in the east. Figure 3 represents an 
average of the two periods; but its shape is considerably influenced by 
period two since growth differences were greater then. 
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Figures 3 and 4 include countries with widely varying latitudes, 
from the Mediterranean to the Nordics. Hence there is a risk that the pat-
terns not only represent east-west dimensions, but also north-south patterns 
of development. For example, Finland and Greece are included in the 
group of countries to the far east and these are also extremes along the 
north-south scale in Europe. In the west, Spain and Portugal are mixed 
with the UK and Ireland, and in the middle, Mezzogiorno in Italy and the 
regions of Norway or Sweden all contribute to the average. As an attempt 
to “purify” the central east-west dimension, we drop regions with a latitude 
below 45 or above 55 degrees. In the south; we drop Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, Bulgaria and parts of Italy and Romania. In the north, we drop the 
Nordic and partly the Baltic area, and a small part of the UK. In this way, 
we make the east poorer and the west richer than in the former sample. 
The cut-off points are evidently arbitrary but the exercise serves to illus-
trate that the east-west gradient is even clearer in this “central belt”. In 
Figures 5, we replicate Figure 3, showing growth rates by longitude for 
this more restricted sample over the whole period.    
 
Figure 5: Average annual regional growth in income per capita, 
1995-2005, for a "central belt"
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Within this central belt from west to east in Europe, the W-shape observed 
in Figure 3 disappears and we approach a clean V or U or W pattern, with 
a minimum at a longitude of 7-9. In our sample, this is mainly an average 
for the regions in Western Germany and Italy. This visualisation of Euro-
pean growth demonstrates that it has a clear spatial dimension.  
One possible continuation of the story would be to undertake 
growth regression analysis; analysing whether growth depends on initial 
income. With our focus on spatial effects, this is however a secondary is-
sue. We will also see later that when we control for spatial effects, initial 
income actually plays a limited role.  
In order to illustrate some methodological issues for the statistical 
analysis, we regress growth rates on longitudes with a dummy that allows 
for a break point at some intermediate longitude: i.e. an equation of the 
form 
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(1)  gi = α + αeast * Deast+ β * LONi + βeast * Deast-i * LONi + εi 
 
where g is the growth rate, Deast is a dummy for observations with longi-
tudes above some critical value, LON is the longitude, ε is the residual, 
and i refers to an individual observation (region). Hence we allow the con-
stant term as well as the slope to be different for higher longitudes, as 
measured by the “deviation parameters” αeast (for the intercept) and βeast 
(for the slope). We experiment with different break points and chose 
LON=8 which gives the highest adjusted R2. This gives the following re-
sults: 
 
Table 1: East-west gradients of regional growth in Europe 
Sample Period α αeast β βeast Adj. R2 N 
1995-2005 4.37 -2.87 -0.13 0.30 0.27 1204 
1995-2000 5.49 -2.07 -0.15 0.22 0.09 1162 
Regions in 23 
EU countries 
plus Norway 2000-2005 3.28 -3.84 -0.11 0.40 0.36 1204 
1995-2005 4.47 -3.82 -0.18 0.43 0.40 846 
1995-2000 5.78 -4.25 -0.23 0.46 0.22 817 “Central belt”  
2000-2005 3.20 -4.58 -0.12 0.50 0.46 846 
Note: Results from OLS regressions. P values were below 0.0001 in all cases. 
 
The results confirm the patterns shown above: Growth is significantly re-
lated to longitude. The fit is better for the second period compared to the 
first, and for the central belt compared to the whole sample. For the central 
belt, adjusted R2 in the second half of the period was 0.46. All parameter 
estimates are highly significant, with P values below 0.0001. 
 These estimates could however suffer from an omitted variable bias 
as well as other aspects that may render the assumption of normally and 
independently distributed residuals invalid. In particular, the regressions 
neglect any country-specific spatial effects. There could be a distinct core-
periphery pattern inside countries, or there could be east-west gradients at 
the country level that differ from those that apply to Europe as a whole. If 
such features are present, the residuals could be spatially correlated at the 
country level. We will revert to such issues in Section 4, after discussing 
potential explanations of the V-shaped growth pattern observed in the 
analysis above.  
 
3. U-shapes revisited: A numerical simulation analysis 
 
In the new economic geography literature, the “U-curve” has become a 
standard term (see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002). Demonstrated in NEG models 
such as Krugman (1991), a common theme is that agglomeration is 
stronger at intermediate levels of trade costs. The presence of trade costs 
creates a disadvantage for the peripheral regions, but with very high trade 
costs trade is limited so the better located regions may not exploit their 
locational advantage. With intermediate barriers this becomes possible. 
But when barriers become low enough, the disadvantage of the periphery 
disappears and a more dispersed pattern of production, with less inequal-
ity, is again possible. Hence when trade costs are gradually lowered from 
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initially high levels, it is expected that agglomeration first increase and 
thereafter decrease when trade costs become low enough.  
 While this theoretical result is plausible, it is formulated in models 
with few regions and limited spatial structure. In the European context, it 
dos not tell us much about where the core actually is located geographi-
cally, or how this might change. Will the so-called “blue banana” from 
London to Milan (Brunet 2002) remain the core of the European economy, 
or will it be weakened and replaced by something else? Europe is affected 
by a number of different processes that affect trade costs: Initial EU inte-
gration, wider European integration, EU enlargement, a number of free 
trade agreements, multilateral liberalisation through the WTO (the World 
Trade Organization), and reduction in transport costs and other trade costs. 
It would be implausible to assume that all these have a similar impact. For 
assessing the spatial impact of such changes, we therefore need a model 
with sufficient dimensionality and an explicit modelling of spatial charac-
teristics. In their survey of the NEG, Fujita and Mori (2005) consider the 
development of higher-dimensional spatial models as one of the top pri-
orities for future research in the field. In order to examine what may ex-
plain the U-patterns observed in Figures 2-5, we therefore develop a nu-
merical simulation model. Another contribution in this direction is Stelder 
(2005), who study the location of European cities using a NEG model with 
labour migration. Various computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
(see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002) may also be relevant, although the do not ex-
plicitly focus on the spatial dimension that is the focus here.  
 In standard NEG models as well as new trade theory models in the 
footsteps of Krugman (1980), results often depend on strong inter-sectoral 
specialisation or trade effects: Large countries or core regions become ex-
porters of scale-based goods, as illustrated by the so-called home market 
effect. In their survey of agglomeration and trade, Head and Mayer (2004, 
2663) however conclude that in empirical work, the relationship between 
agglomeration and income levels is more strongly supported than the rela-
tionship between agglomeration and trade specialisation. For Europe, one 
finds a variety of patterns at the industry level (see e.g. Forslid et al. 2002, 
and the survey in Combes and Overman 2004). Comparing Western 
Europe and the USA, one finds less industrial concentration in Europe, and 
one might therefore expect a more even income distribution across re-
gions. The opposite is however the case (Puga 2002, Melchior 2008a), and 
this casts some doubt about the predictions of NEG models with strong net 
trade effects.6  
 This evidence is one reason why in this paper, we try another ap-
proach to agglomeration and income differences. Krugman (1980) showed 
that differences in market access may show up in two ways; either as inter-
sectoral net trade effects or, alternatively, as wage effects. As an alterna-
tive to the models with net trade effects, we therefore try out a model 
where the whole economy is collapsed into a single sector, producing dif-
ferentiated goods with economies of scale. While the volume of trade var-
ies across scenarios, there are no net trade effects, and differences in mar-
                                                 
6 The net trade effects normally also depend on strong asymmetries across sectors; for 
example that there are trade costs for one sector and not the other, and when these asym-
metries are dropped, the net trade effects may disappear (see Davis 1998). 
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ket access show up only in differences in nominal and real wages. We will 
therefore call it the wage gap model. In the following, we explain the 
structure of the model. 
 
3.1. The wage gap model 
 
There are N regions. Each region, indexed i or j, has a single factor of pro-
duction; labour, with endowment Li and wage wi. The total income of the 
economy is therefore Yi=wiLi. Following a standard Dixit-Stiglitz ap-
proach, labour can be used in the production of individual varieties of 
manufactured goods under increasing returns to scale. For an individual 
variety xi produced in region i, there is, measured in labour units, a fixed 
production cost f, constant marginal costs c and trade costs tij for sales in 
market j. For a good produced in region i and sold in market j, the cost in 
value terms is equal to wi (f+ctijxij). Trade costs are expressed as a mark-up 
on marginal costs so tij≥1, e.g. a trade cost of 10% implies tij=1.1. 7  
 We assume standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) de-
mand functions, so demand for a variety from region i in market j is equal 
to xij = pij-εPjε-1Yj where pij is the price of a variety from region i in market 
j, ε is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (with the standard 
assumption ε>1), Pj is the CES price index in region j. With monopolistic 
competition, firms maximise profits πi=-fwi+ Σj (pij-wictij)xij, and we ob-
tain the standard pricing condition pij=[ε/(ε-1)] wi ctij. Furthermore, free 
entry and exit imply that total profits for a firm have to equal sunk costs f, 
and as a consequence the total value of sales for a firm in region i will be 
εfwi.  
 Now write vij = xijpij for the value of sales of an individual firm 
from region i in some market j. Dividing vij by vjj, we can express the sales 
vij in some market j as a function of the home market sales vjj of firms in 
that market: Using the demand functions and the pricing condition, we 
obtain vij = vjj * (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε. Using this, the total sales of a firm in 
region i, ∑j vij=εfwi, can be written as  
 
∑j vjj (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε= εfwi  
 
or, moving the common term wi to the right hand side,  
 
∑j vjj wjε-1 (tij/tjj)1-ε= εf*wiε.  
 
For the N regions, we have N equations with 2N unknowns (vii, wi). In 
order to express this in matrix form, we define 
 
                                                 
7 We consider it simpler in terms of notation to express trade costs as a mark-up on mar-
ginal costs rather than the usual iceberg formulation where goods melt away in transport. 
The results are similar. 
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T expresses the relative trade costs in all markets, relative to domestic 
supply. Using this, the equation system above can be written as 
 
(1)  TN×N × Diag (wiε-1) N×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × [wiε]N×1 
 
where Diag (wiε-1) N×N is the diagonal matrix with wiε-1 as diagonal ele-
ments, [vii] N×1 is a vector with vii (i.e. the home market sales of firms in 
each region) as elements, and [wiε]N×1 is a vector with wiε as diagonal ele-
ments. 
 Since manufacturing is the only sector in the economy, the sales of 
all firms in market j must add up to Yj; i.e. ∑i nivij=Yj. ni is the number of 
manufacturing firms in region i, and since there is no firm heterogeneity, 
and no sunk exports costs, all firms will sell a (large or small) positive 
amount in any market. Expressing all vij’s in terms of home market sales as 
above, we can put wi and vii on the right hand side and obtain the system of 
N equations  
 
(2)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [ni] N×1  
= Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Yi]N×1 
 
Given that firm size is determined (see above) and assuming full employ-
ment, the number of manufacturing firms must be ni= wiLi/(εfwi)= Li/(εf). 
Thereby eliminating the unknowns ni, we obtain a system with 2N un-
knowns that may be solved. Equation (2) then simplifies to:  
 
(2a)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Li] N×1  
= εf × Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi2-ε) N×N × [Li]N×1 
 
This is however a non-linear system where no explicit analytical solution 
can be found.8 We therefore use numerical simulation in order to deter-
mine the outcome. As noted, we call this the wage gap model since differ-
ences in market access show up in different nominal wages. In addition, 
real wages or welfare will be affected by the price level of each region, 
and welfare can be simply expressed as wi/Pi.  
 In the following, we will use this model as a tool to derive predic-
tions about how European integration and other changes in trade costs may 
affect the income distribution in Europe. In Melchior (2008b), the model 
and the calculations are explained and discussed in greater detail, and the 
model is compared to a model with strong trade effects (the home market 
                                                 
8 In Melchior (2008b) we show that the equation can be solved in some special cases but 
the results are not very user-friendly so we have to rely mainly on simulation.  
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effect model of Krugman 1980). The latter may be considered as an ex-
treme “representative” of a broader class of models, including NEG mod-
els, that rely on net trade or specialisation effects. It turns out that the wel-
fare results in the two models are closely correlated but the specialisation 
or net trade effects in the latter sometimes differ considerably from other 
results. The nominal wage effects in the wage gap model are more closely 
correlated with the welfare results. This was checked for a variety of sce-
narios and especially for the reduction in spatially related trade costs (such 
as transport costs), the two models may give rather different predictions. 
The welfare results are however still similar, and this may suggest that the 
nominal and real wage effects in the wage gap model are of a more general 
nature than some of the net trade effects in the home market effect model.  
 The wage gap model has the property that wage differences are 
reduced monotonically when trade barriers come down. Hence there is no 
U-shape in the sense that differences first increase and then fall as barriers 
are reduced. Furthermore, there are no “bifurcations” or multiple equilib-
ria; the model has a determinate solution.  This is a deliberate choice for 
two reasons: First, we are to solve a highly non-linear model with many 
unknowns, so we need a tractable model. Analysis of bifurcations and 
break points can be demanding even with two regions, and with 90 regions 
(the number we use) the number of potential equilibria could be daunting.  
Secondly, we have seen from Figure 2 that the economic geography of 
Europe is a relatively smooth surface and we want a model with a continu-
ous scale of outcomes rather than catastrophic agglomeration in a few re-
gions.  
 For model simulations with many regions, it is important that the 
model is well-behaved in the sense that it has a positive and economically 
meaningful solution. The home market effect model can easily be gener-
alised to many regions, but there is positive production of manufactured 
goods in all regions only for a range of parameter values (see e.g. Helpman 
and Krugman 1985, Chapter 10). In a setting with many regions, this range 
is quite limited, since some region will be “deindustrialised” even for quite 
high levels of trade costs. The wage gap model is much better in this sense, 
and in the simulations undertaken, we obtain positive and economically 
meaningful outcomes in all cases. 
 
3.2. Some simulation results 
 
In order create a stylised spatial pattern where computations are techni-
cally manageable and results are easy to interpret, it was chosen to use a 
rectangular grid with 9 countries and 90 regions.9 This is shown in Figure 
6, where the solid-line squares and rectangles represent countries and each 
dot inside represents a region. Each region is assumed to have the same 
population size. 
 
                                                 
9 It was tried with true regional coordinates but the number of regions in the wider Europe 
is then more than 400 at the NUTS2 level of classification. This creates more technical 
difficulties and this option was left as a possibility in future research. 
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Figure 6: A stylised European space with 90 regions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Longitude
La
tit
ud
e
   W1
   W2
 
      W4
     C1
      C2
    E1
      E2
      W3
      E3
  
 
While the map is highly stylized, the idea is to capture aspects of the true 
European space. The four countries W1-W4 to the left represent the “old 
EU” or Western Europe whereas C1-C2 represent the “new members” or 
Central Europe. Eastern Europe is represented by E1-E3, of which one 
(E1) is a large, long and narrow country which is meant to capture some 
dimensions of Russia. E2 could in terms of geographic position resemble 
Turkey or Ukraine and E3 might represent Eurasian countries further east. 
The 90-region landscape has distinct North-South and even more East-
West dimensions; there is a sufficiently rich regional structure inside each 
country, and we have a sufficient number of countries to study different 
integration scenarios, and their impact on insiders and outsiders.  
The map in Figure 6 captures some aspects of the true European space 
but we should nevertheless be aware of its limitations: 
 
- There is no outside world so the model will tend to overestimate the 
isolation of regions at the borders of the landscape. Given that e.g. re-
gions in the Russian Far East is now benefiting from more intensive 
trade with China, USA and others, this is a limitation.  
- The landscape is stylized and misses many features of true geography, 
which has more countries, oceans, lakes, mountains, climatic differ-
ences and so on. Especially the North-South dimension is limited and 
allows limited analysis of e.g. EU enlargement towards the South and 
North. This is however deliberate since our focus here is particularly 
on the East-West dimension; in the lights of the patterns of change we 
have shown earlier. 
 
A core feature of the approach used here is that we include some trade 
costs that are a function of distance, and others that are independent of 
distance. We call the first spatial or distance-dependent trade costs, and 
the second non-spatial or distance-independent. As shown by Melchior 
(2000), see also Behrens et al. (2007); when the two types are present si-
multaneously one obtains qualitatively new effects on the spatial distribu-
tion of activity or incomes that are not present when each is considered in 
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isolation. In the model simulations, trade costs always include a spatial as 
well as a non-spatial component. 
We may think of spatial trade costs as transport costs, and non-
spatial trade costs as “trade policy”. This is however not fully clear and it 
could also be the case that policy-shaped barriers or regulations have a 
spatial dimension. In the European context, the European internal market 
is a large-scale project containing thousands of reforms, of which some 
may be spatial and others non-spatial. For example, if geographical dis-
tance also reflects institutional similarity, standards and regulations could 
be more similar in countries and regions that are close to each other. The 
relationship between transport costs and distance is also not straightfor-
ward: while e.g. the costs of road transportation in Europe may be mo-
notonously increasing with distance, this may not be so clear for long-dis-
tance sea freight. In the analysis, trade costs represent distribution costs in 
general, and it is an empirical issue which trade costs are spatial and non-
spatial, and which are politically determined and which are not.  
 In the model simulations, trade costs always include a spatial as 
well as a non-spatial component. Spatial trade costs are present within as 
well as between nations. We simply use distances in the rectangular grid 
(Figur 6) and scale it with some factor. Next, we assume that there are 
non-spatial trade costs present between all regions, also within nations. We 
use three levels; within nations (tdomestic), between regions in different na-
tions but within the same trade bloc (trta, where the rta subscript refers to 
some regional trade agreement), and between regions in different nations 
that have made no special integration agreement (tmfn, where mfn refers to 
Most Favoured Nation). We assume tdomestic<trta<tmfn and for simplicity we 
let the level for regional integration be mid-way between the domestic and 
MFN barriers. If we had allowed tdomestic=trta countries would not exist any 
more. Since international trade costs are always higher than the domestic 
ones, countries continue to matter in all scenarios.   
We run simulations with different levels of trade costs in order to 
check whether levels matter. But since there is no “U-effect” in the NEG 
sense described above, the level does not matter too much for the qualita-
tive results. We therefore report here results only for simulations with me-
dium-level trade costs. In this case, non-spatial trade costs are 10% (do-
mestically), 20% (in regional trade agreements) and 30% (between coun-
tries without RTA’s). In addition, there are distance-related trade costs 
ranging from 3.5% (to the neighbour region) to 50% (for the maximum 
distance). In this case, average trade costs of all kinds, spatial and non-
spatial, is about 45%. Considering that Anderson and van Wijnkoop 
(2003) found that total trade costs broadly defined, including distribution 
costs, could be as high as 170% of the production price, this is not very 
high. 
We start with a base case with no regional integration, and then 
proceed to a scenario with Western integration (WEST), where the coun-
tries W1-W4 reduce non-spatial trade costs between them from 30 to 20%. 
In order to present the results in a compact and easily accessible way, we 
report results along the 5th latitude, i.e. along the line running through the 
centre of countries W1, W3, C1 and E1; including 15 of the 90 regions in 
our landscape. More details and a richer picture are shown in Melchior 
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(2008b), including tables with the number involved as well as sensitivity 
analysis.  
In Figure 7, we show the change in real income for the 15 regions 
at the 5th latitude. We use alternating colours in order to distinguish be-
tween countries; with W1 and C1 darker than W3 and E1. 
 
Figure 7: Western integration - real wage 
changes
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Western integration creates a welfare gain for the integrating countries and 
a slight loss for those outside. This “agglomeration shadow” aspect of in-
tegration is well known from new trade theory models of regional integra-
tion; see e.g. the survey of Baldwin and Venables (1995). In such models, 
however, this discrimination effect corresponds to a net trade effect; there 
is “production shifting” whereby the trade bloc increases its net exports of 
manufactured goods. In the wage gap model, there is only one sector so 
there is no export surplus, and no net trade effects (although the trade vol-
ume is affected). The “welfare shifting”, as we may call it, is therefore 
caused by changes nominal wages and price levels, due to lower trade 
costs. For the integrating countries, there is an increase in trade. 
Another new feature of the results shown here is due to the disag-
gregation of countries into regions: The impact of integration varies across 
regions within each country. Integration creates centralisation in the new 
trade bloc, and central regions gain more than the peripheries. Outside the 
trade bloc, the “agglomeration shadow” bites harder for regions close to 
the border of the new bloc.  
The WEST scenario is intended to represent the pre-1990 situation 
with integration in Western Europe. Later, the EU internal market has been 
established; Western and Central Europe have been integrated through the 
Europe Agreements between EU and Central European countries, other 
free trade agreements (e.g. between EFTA and Central Europe), and re-
cently EU enlargement. Furthermore, there was liberalisation within the 
WTO and unilateral liberalisation by some Eastern European countries 
(e.g. Ukraine). According to our terminology, these reforms would reduce 
non-spatial trade costs. In addition, there could have been a reduction of 
spatial trade costs, either as a consequence of the European internal market 
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or because of improved transport supply. EU monetary integration couls 
also have an impact. 
In order to capture the spatial impact of these reforms, we show 
three different scenarios:  
 
- WIDER is the extension of the western trade bloc to include Central 
Europe. 
- WTO represents multilateral liberalisation, reducing tmfn from 30 to 
25%. Observe that trta in this case stays unchanged at 20% so there is 
“preference erosion” by which the margin of preference for the trade 
bloc is reduced. 
- SPATIAL represents a reduction in spatial trade costs by half. We as-
sume that this applies between all regions in Figure 6.10 Hence the 
maximum level of distance-related trade costs is now 25%.  
 
In all the three cases, we show changes in real income from scenario 
WEST. The results are presented in Figures 8-10. Figures A2-A4 in the 
Appendix also show nominal wage changes. The spatial profiles of these 
are largely similar to the real wage changes, but in some regions there are 
also nominal wage reductions. In some of these cases, the fall in prices is 
however large enough so there is a real wage increase. When interpreting 
the results, observe that the scale of each reform is not comparable: the 
percentage-point reduction in trade costs is largest in SPATIAL and small-
est in WTO. Hence unless one corrects for the “size of the shock”, one 
should look at the patterns rather than the absolute magnitude of the ef-
fects. 
 
 
Figure 8: Wider European integration 
Change in real income along 5th latitude
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 re
al
 in
co
m
e
       W1                  W3                   C1                             E1
----West-Central European trade bloc-----
 
                                                 
10 Later, we revert to a scenario where the reduction in spatial trade costs is higher in 
Western Europe. 
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Figure 9: General trade liberalisation (scenario WTO)
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Figure 10: Reduced distance costs (SPATIAL)
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An important message from these results is that different forms of trade 
liberalisation have quite distinct and different spatial effects. Hence there 
is no unambiguous rule telling how international integration affects do-
mestic regions: this varies across scenarios. Whether it creates more or less 
regional inequality inside countries, also depends on the initial situation. 
For example, western regions in W1 were initially worse off and therefore 
regional inequality in W1 increases Figures 8 and 9 while it is reduced in 
Figure 10.  
 Turning to the results, we observe: 
 
- In the WIDER scenario, the results for WEST are just moved one step 
eastward: The Central European countries obtain a large gain by being 
taken from the “agglomeration shadow” into the trade bloc, and the 
shadow is moved one step further east. The former WEST bloc also 
gains from widening. Interestingly, the gain is larger for regions close 
to the new members, so there is no reason for incumbents to fear the 
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competition from the newcomers.11 Eastern Europe however loses 
from WIDER in real income terms, but quite modestly. 
- All countries and regions gain welfare from general trade liberalisation 
(WTO), but countries and regions outside the existing WEST bloc gain 
more. The reason is the “preference erosion” that eliminates some of 
the integration advantages obtained by the western countries. For this 
reason, the gain from WTO is also larger for Central Europe, which is 
more harmed by being excluded from WEST. 
- When distance-related trade costs are reduced in SPATIAL, it is gener-
ally to the benefit of the peripheries, so the change has indeed a U-
shape; although the story behind is quite different from the NEG ver-
sion. SPATIAL weakens the impact of geography. In real Europe as 
well as the simulations, there is a gravity-like central agglomeration 
with higher income in central areas. When the disadvantage of being 
peripheral is reduced, this centralisation pattern is reversed.  
 
Since the spatial patterns vary strongly across scenarios, there are no gen-
eral predictions. Hence one may not assume generally that “western re-
gions in Central Europe will gain more from integration” or that “regions 
with a greater market potential will gain more”. While such expectations 
have been used as a platform for research, our results suggest that the ap-
propriate hypothesis depends on the specific integration scenario as well as 
the initial income of regions. As noted above, general predictions about 
how international integration will affect domestic regional inequality are 
not warranted, for similar reasons. 
Do any of the scenarios help us understand the U-shaped pattern of 
growth shown in Figures 3-5? Considering the shape, our first bet would 
be SPATIAL, given the similar U shape in Figure 9. A caveat is that the 
minimum of the U-curve for SPATIAL is in Central Europe, while in real 
Europe (as in Figure 5) it is in Western Europe, corresponding to W3-W4 
in our model. This is however only a technical issue and not a strong ob-
jection: The location of the minimum point in the simulation could easily 
be changed by technical adjustments to the model (we will show this 
later).  
Therefore, the SPATIAL scenario is a candidate explanation for the 
observed change in Europe’s east-west geography. This is however only a 
suggestion; more specific evidence is needed to draw a conclusion. This 
tentative suggestion is nevertheless surprising, given that we would expect 
wider European integration to be a more dominating during the time pe-
riod studied. The WIDER scenario however captures only reductions in 
non-spatial trade costs, and it could be the case that the EU internal market 
actually also changes the distance-related costs. Institutional convergence, 
improved infrastructure and scale economies in the transport sector are 
potential explanations. The EU internal market is a massive institutional 
reform, creating institutional convergence across European countries. It 
contains thousands of reforms and regulations. While it was established in 
1992, it is plausible to believe that the implementation takes time and the 
                                                 
11 As seen from the Appendix, Figure A2, there is a nominal wage reduction for all the 
former members, but the price level reduction is sufficient to secure a welfare gain, as 
shown in Figure 8. 
 24
full effects could appear during the period studied here, i.e. 1995-2005. 
According to Herderschee and Qiao (2007) the impact of the Europe 
Agreements between the EU and Central Europe, which were established 
in the early 1990s, would take 15 years to materialise. Given the complex-
ity of the internal market reform, it would be plausible to expect that its 
impact would materialise over a long period. Regional transfers could also 
matter; if the magnitude of such transfers is inversely related to income 
levels (and these have a spatial profile as in Figure 2). For Western 
Europe, monetary integration could also be a candidate explanation. 
One path towards obtaining more decisive evidence would be to 
undertake more research on the spatial characteristics of economic activity 
(trade, investment, budget transfers etc.) (see e.g. Anderson and Yotov 
2008 for an interesting recent contribution on gravity and border effects). 
Another research option, which we shall pursue here, is to derive more 
detailed but still macro-level predictions from the model scenarios and 
check if they are supported by the data. In Section 4, we therefore examine 
whether growth differences and changes in inequality across regions 
within countries are in line with the model predictions. 
In the analysis, we will examine all three scenarios presented in 
Figures 8-10. Even if it would turn out that SPATIAL is relevant, we still 
know that widening of European integration as well as some WTO liber-
alisation have actually happened, so in real life we would expect to ob-
serve a pattern affected by various reforms that have occurred in the 1995-
2005 period.  
 
4. Spatial inequality and growth differences across regions within 
European countries 
 
Is the spatial pattern of growth observed in Figures 2-5 driven by differ-
ences across countries only, or does it also apply within countries? It is 
evident that the pattern is to a large extent driven by cross-country differ-
ences, as shown in Melchior (2008a). Especially after 2000, Central and 
Eastern European countries have on average grown faster, and this con-
tributes to convergence. But are there also domestic growth differences 
within each country with a similar east-west gradient? For example; do 
growth differences across regions in France have an east-west gradient so 
that western regions grow faster? According to the simulation model, this 
should indeed be the case and if it is supported empirically, it could bring 
us one step further. We therefore proceed by deriving some of these impli-
cations, and check whether they are supported by the evidence. 
 We therefore proceed to an analysis where we test econometrically 
whether regional growth within each country has an east-west or north-
south gradient, but also controlling for other types of spatial income or 
growth differences. As a point of departure, Table 2 shows the model pre-
dictions about whether real income growth will have an eastward or west-
ward bias. 
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Table 2: Will real income growth be higher in the east or 
west of a country? Predictions from model simulations 
Countries in simulation Scenario W1-W2 W3-W4 C1-C2 E1-E2 
WEST East West East East 
WIDER East East West East 
WTO East/Neutral East West West 
SPATIAL West West U-shaped East 
Explanatory note: “East” e.g. indicates that income growth is 
expected to be higher in the eastern parts of the relevant 
countries (shown in the column headings). 
 
As noted above, minimum growth in the SPATIAL scenario is obtained 
for Central European countries but we consider that an outcome where the 
U-shaped outcome occurs for W3-W4 would also be technically possible.  
As seen from Table 2, the predicted effects again vary across sce-
narios. If the SPATIAL scenario is to receive further support, we should 
find western gradients of income growth in western countries, and eastern 
gradients inside eastern countries, with a neutral/ U-shaped pattern in some 
intermediate range.  
One possible method for analysing these country-level spatial ef-
fects would be to pool the data and allow constant terms and slopes to vary 
also across countries. Determinants of spatial patterns however vary con-
siderably across countries and this variation is difficult to handle properly 
in pooled regressions.12 Furthermore; there is no common pan-European 
prediction about the signs of parameters so in one sense the pooled regres-
sion is inconsistent unless we have specific methods to address heteroge-
neity. Indeed heterogeneity is our research focus and not something that 
we want to “correct for” in order to derive “general law” about spatial 
change, for example by some econometric approach with general assump-
tions about the pattern of spatial autocorrelation. Since our model predicts 
heterogeneous outcomes rather than some general law about spatial 
change, we address the issues by means of country-level regressions.  
The number of observations at the country level is on average 49 
but varies from 5 to 348, and for five countries it is 10 or below. We there-
fore drop six countries with 12 regional observations or less. For some 
other countries with more but still few observations, regressions are not 
that reliable but we nevertheless include them in the analysis. Hence we 
will examine spatial gradients of regional growth in 22 countries. For 
Germany, we also report results for West and East separately. Given our 
interest in the east-west gradient of growth, we include longitude (LON) in 
the analysis, and also latitude (LAT) in order to examine north-south ef-
fects.  
                                                 
12 Also in a growth regression framework, there is a parallel problem with convergence 
across the EU (i.e. poor countries or regions grow faster), but variable outcomes within 
countries, with divergence between regions in a majority of countries (see Melchior 
2008a). This variation is difficult to capture accurately in pooled regressions. 
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In addition to our examination of causes of spatial income change, 
the analysis also adds to the descriptive accounting of European regional 
inequality, by quantifying changes that are not captured by standard meas-
ures of regional inequality such as the Gini or Theil indexes. These in-
dexes measure overall inequality without addressing geographical redistri-
bution of income. For example; if there is a relative increase in the west 
and a relative decline east in some country, the Gini may be unchanged 
even if there has been a substantial change in the spatial income distribu-
tion. The analysis here therefore adds a new dimension compared to earlier 
analysis of regional inequality in Europe, such as Förster et al. (2003), 
Römisch (2003) or Melchior (2008a).13  
Analysing east-west and north-south gradients of the growth pat-
tern would however be too limited since spatial growth inequality could be 
caused by other factors. In the empirical analysis, we therefore try to con-
trol for such aspects. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, higher income levels and growth in 
capital regions is a common feature (see e.g. Brülhart and Koenig 2006, 
Landesmann and Römisch 2006, Melchior 2008a). Countries with high 
regional inequality also have agglomeration in capital regions, so there 
may be a core-peripery pattern that is quite distinct from the east-west or 
north-south geographical patterns that we have examined. Melchior 
(2008b) shows model simulations with a hub-and-spoke pattern inside 
countries, where capital regions act as hubs for the foreign trade of periph-
eral regions. In this case, east-west growth differences tend to be modified 
since the peripheral regions cannot exploit their proximity to foreign mar-
kets. For example, according to this regions in western Poland cannot ex-
ploit their proximity to the EU-15 market so they remain peripheral and 
gains from integration accrue disproportionately to the capital region.   In 
order to capture capital region dominance in the empirical analysis, we 
include the distance of each region to the capital (CAP) as a variable. 
In the economic geography literature, a common theme is also that 
market potential or the proximity to markets can be a determinant of 
growth. Regarding international markets, the idea here is to capture that 
indirectly through the longitude and latitude variables. Domestically, there 
may however also be such a market potential effect. We capture this 
through the variable CORE, which is the distance from each region to an 
economic centre point. This is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of 
coordinates (longitude and latitude) for all regions in each country.14  
In some countries, the capital of a country is also close to the eco-
nomic centre point so that CAP and CORE are highly correlated. This is 
however not always the case, and in some cases the correlation is 0.5 or 
lower. This is the case for e.g. Poland and Ukraine. Furthermore, capitals 
                                                 
13 Landesmann and Römisch (2006, 5) maintain that income per capita levels are rela-
tively higher in the western border regions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, and to some extent Romania, and the authors attribute this to market potential 
(proximity to the EU-15 market) as well as foreign direct investment. More analysis of 
the issue is however not presented. 
14 We also calculated population-weighted centre points but these are highly correlated 
with the GDP-weighted measure and give similar results. Results using the population-
weighted measure are therefore not reported. 
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or economic centre points may be located to the east, west, north or south 
of a country and in that case they will be correlated with LON or LAT. For 
example, Austria, Ireland, Lithuania and Poland have eastern capitals and 
CAP is then highly (and negatively) correlated with LON. Similarly, high 
positive correlations between CAP and LON are observed for Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Western Germany (where we use Bonn as the capital), 
Norway, Russia and Turkey, due to their western capitals. Unless we take 
this into account, we may mix up geographical east-west effects with the 
growth of capital regions. For example, it is commonly assumed that there 
is a strong capital city effect in Russia, but when the east-west dimension 
is taken into account, we will see from later results that this is not such a 
robust result any more. 
In Table A2 in the Appendix, we show the most relevant correla-
tions between the four variables LON, LAT, CAP and CORE. Table A2 
provides a guide for the regressions, by indicating where correlations are 
high and collinearity may represent a problem.  
An issue is whether we should include initial income, as in growth 
regressions. For example, one might argue that growth in some region is 
due to its capital endowment and not its geographical location, and if we 
omit the initial income variable or some other variable reflecting the capi-
tal-labour ratio, the estimates would be biased. Against this, it could be 
argued that LON and LAT are not as such causes and we are not looking 
for causality in a standard sense: According to the model, LON and LAT 
are macro-level indicator variables reflecting a more complex underlying 
pattern driven by scale economies, imperfect competition and differences 
in trade costs. Hence we use LAT and LON to describe the spatial pattern 
of growth and check whether this spatial pattern conforms to the model. 
We start by using this latter approach; running regressions without the 
income variable. However, we also undertake regressions with initial in-
come y0 included (in logs) in order to see how this affects the results.  
LON, LAT and CAP do not change over time and CORE changes 
only a little. For this reason, there is little to gain from a panel approach 
and we start by running country-level OLS regressions of the form  
 
(2) gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * CAPi + γ4 * COREi + εi 
 
and later with ln(y0) added on the right hand side. This specification is 
linear in all variables. For LON and LAT a linear approximation seems 
plausible, since the range covered for each country is limited. For CAP and 
CORE it is less clear that a linear specification is the appropriate choice, 
and this is an empirical issue with little à priori guidance. The shape of  
spatial agglomeration around capitals or economic centres may not be a 
“pyramid” – as we assume in equation (2) – but bell-shaped or inverse U-
shaped. If that is the case, equation (2) is mis-specified and the estimates 
may be biased. We try to avoid this by using, alternatively, the following 
two other specifications: 
 
(3) gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * ln(CAPi) + γ4 * ln(COREi) + εi 
 
 28
(4) gi = α + γ1 * LONi + γ2 * LATi + γ3 * CAPi  + γ5 * CAPi2  
+ γ4 * COREi + γ6 * COREi2 + εi 
 
Equation (3) is in logs while equation (4) adds quadratic terms for CAP 
and CORE in order to better capture the curvature the core-periphery di-
mension.15  In the analysis, we try the three specifications above and 
report the specification with the highest adjusted R2. If some parameters 
are insignificant due to collinearity, we rerun the equations with some 
variables excluded. If different specifications give different results for 
LON and CAP, which we consider as variables of particular importance, 
we take this into account in the reporting of results. Hence if e.g. LON 
obtains a particular result only in one specification but not others, we ex-
amine further the reasons behind.16  
 The number of observations is low in some cases even if we have 
dropped some smaller countries. Especially for such countries, results may 
be unduly affected by outliers. We therefore also run robust regressions in 
all cases in order to check whether outliers unduly affect the results.17 In 
some cases where robust regression lead to a change in the conclusions, 
e.g. that a significant estimate becomes insignificant in the robust regres-
sions, we report this. In some cases where the number of observations is 
small, this type of robust regression may not capture underlying problems 
with “leverage points”. We revert to this when reporting the results. 
 As noted, we also undertake regressions where the log of initial 
income is included as a right hand side variable. In Appendix Table A3, 
we report correlations between initial income and the four spatial variables 
used (LON, LAT, CAP, CORE).  In general, these correlations are lower 
than between the spatial variables, but in some cases, income levels have a 
strong spatial pattern. By using Tables A2 and A3, the interested reader 
may trace the economic geography of each country; i.e. where income is 
higher, where the economic mass is concentrated, the role of the capital, 
east-west and north-south dimensions.  
In Appendix Tables A4 and A5, we report the results when average 
annual growth in GDP per capita is the dependent variable, without and 
with the initial income level (ln(y0)) included, respectively. 18  
                                                 
15 Since the capital region has CAP=0 and ln(0) is not defined we actually use ln(1+CAP) 
in equation (3). 
16 The CAP and CORE variables may capture agglomeration related to one or two refer-
ence points in each country, depending on whether the two variables are highly correlated 
or not. If the two variables are highly correlated, we are essentially controlling for a 
“monocentric” pattern of agglomeration with one central location. This may not be ap-
propriate since countries may have a hierarchy of agglomerations. Especially for larger 
countries such as Russia, this monocentricity may be a limitation of the analysis. It is 
however beyond the scope of this analysis to provide an in-depth analysis of “multicen-
tric” patterns of agglomeration in each country. This is left as a task for future research. 
17 We use standard robust regressions as suggested by Huber (1973) and discussed in e.g. 
Maddala (1988); so-called M regressions. Such regressions use iterative procedures and 
adjusted R2 is not appropriate as test statistics. R2 is reported by the SAS software output 
and is used instead, in the Appendix tables.  
18 We also tried the log of income per capita growth but this did not improve the fit so the 
growth rate was used.  
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As an alternative or supplement to per capita income growth as the 
dependent variable, other variables could be considered, such as wages, 
employment or prices. Such data are however generally not available at the 
NUTS3 level which we use in order to have a sufficient number of obser-
vations. We do however have population data, and these may be of interest 
due to migration and also since GDP per capita is affected by population 
change. Here we could imagine various mechanisms; e.g. that migration 
exceeds job growth so GDP per capita declines in spite of a growing econ-
omy; or economic decline causing population decline and this adds to in-
come per capita. As a check on whether such aspects matter, we run re-
gressions with equation (3) using population growth as dependent variable. 
Here we also include initial income per capita in order to examine whether 
higher income drives population growth or migration. These results are 
reported in Table A6 in the Appendix. 
Tables A4-A6 contain many results and in order to facilitate the 
interpretation, Table 3 sums up the main qualitative results. These con-
cluding results are obtained after checking different specifications as well 
as robust regressions. Some borderline cases are marked with an asterisk, 
indication some remaining uncertainty about the reliability of the esti-
mates. There are also cases with high collinearity, for example when CAP 
and CORE are highly correlated, where it is hard to say whether one or the 
other is true. For some countries with a low number of observations, re-
sults remain significant in spite of repeated checking, but we maintain 
some scepticism due to extreme results. This is especially the case for the 
Czech Republic, with a modest 14 observations. Visual inspection of the 
data suggests that there is a remaining problem with outliers that is not 
taken into account through the type of robust regressions used.  
In order to see how the results relate to our theoretical framework 
as well as earlier empirical results, Table 3 ranks countries according to 
longitude as in Figure A1 in the Appendix. As an exception, the Nordic 
countries are reported separately at the bottom of the table, since they are 
located far from the central east-west axis of Europe and have few signifi-
cant spatial patterns. In the table, some of the most important results are 
marked with shaded areas. 
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Table 3: Summary of regressions on spatial determinants of income and population growth 
in European countries 
Explanatory notes: 
- For LON, LAT: E.g. “West” indicates higher growth in the west, equivalent to a significant 
negative estimate for LON, and “South” indicates higher growth in the south i.e. a significant 
negative estimate for LAT. 
- For CAP, CORE: “Yes” indicates an agglomeration effect with lower growth further away 
from the capital or economic centre point; i.e. a significantly negative parameter estimate. 
“Reverse” indicates a positive estimate which reflects higher growth further away from the 
capital or centre point.. 
- For Y0: “Converge” indicates a significant negative estimates so poor regions grow faster; 
“Diverge” the opposite. 
Income per capita growth Population growth 
Countries 
(ranked by 
longitude) LON LAT CAP CORE Y0 LON LAT 
N 
Portugal      West  28 
UK   Yes    South 126 
Spain West South  Reverse  East South 47 
France West South  Reverse   South 99 
Belgium    Yes  East  42 
Netherlands West North  Yes    38 
Germany East South* Reverse* Yes Converge   414 
W. Germany East South  Yes Converge West South 348 
Italy East   Yes Converge  North 99 
E. Germany   Reverse Yes  West  66 
Austria  South  Yes  West  35 
Czech Rep. East* South* Yes* Reverse*  West*  14 
Croatia  South      21 
Poland   Yes     16 
Hungary   Yes     20 
Greece West* North* Yes Reverse* Converge   51 
Romania West  Yes   East  42 
Bulgaria   Yes  Converge East  28 
Ukraine  South* Yes*  Diverge West  27 
Turkey East North   Converge  South 79 
Russia    Reverse*  West South 79 
Nordic countries 
Norway        19 
Sweden   Yes    South 21 
Finland     Converge   19 
Note: Details are found in Tables A4-A6 in the Appendix. An asterisk indicates some remaining uncer-
tainty about the reliability of estimates. 
 
From the Appendixes we observe that the average value of adjusted R2 is 
0.20 for the regressions with per capita income growth as dependent vari-
able but without initial income included. When initial income included, 
this average increases to 0.25. Including initial income however does not 
change the results very much, and most of the results in Table 3 are sup-
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ported in both cases. When population is the dependent variable, average 
adjusted R2 is 0.28; indicating that population has even stronger spatial 
gradients than income change.  
 From Table 3, it is evident that we find significant spatial gradients 
in slightly less than half of the possible cases. The lack of a pattern in 
some countries is however also a relevant result, and in many cases there 
are plausible explanations why results may be insignificant. 
 For Western Europe from Spain to Italy, the results for LON are in 
conformity with our earlier results in Figures 3-5: Corresponding to this U-
shape, there is a western gradient of regional growth within Spain, France 
and the Netherlands, and an Eastern gradient for West Germany (and 
Germany as a whole) and Italy.19 In the latter family, we also find the 
Czech Republic as a borderline case.  The North-South gradients may sug-
gest there is also decentralisation in the North-South direction; with a 
Northern gradient for the Netherlands and a southern gradient for Spain, 
France, West Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic. The results indi-
cate that the “blue banana” is weakened and there is decentralisation com-
pared to the formerly inverse U-shaped income distribution shown in Fig-
ure 2. Interestingly, this is combined with a systematic pattern of results 
for the CORE variables: Proximity to the domestic market potential is a 
driver for regional growth in Belgium, Netherland, Germany, Italy and 
Austria; whereas further west (in Spain and France) and east (in the Czech 
Republic) growth is higher away from the economic centres of gravity. 
Hence in the low-growth area, domestic market potential plays an in-
creasing role. This mechanism is not reflected in the model simulations, 
and we leave for further research to sort out the mechanisms behind this 
effect.   
Moving one step further east, or one step down in Table 3, to Cen-
tral Europe, the pattern of results is completely changed: Now we find few 
east-west or north-south gradients of growth, and few significant results 
for CORE. On the other hand there are significant capital region effects for 
all countries covered in this range. For the Czech Republic, Poland, Hun-
gary, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, there are significant nega-
tive estimates for CAP, indicating that regions further away from the 
capital have lower growth. Evidence on the role of capitals in Central 
Europe was also provided by Brülhart and Koenig (2006). 
For Western Europe, the geographical pattern between and within 
countries are similar, but in Central Europe, the east-west gradient is 
driven by cross-country changes and not reflected in the domestic pattern 
of growth in these countries. As noted, this is in conformity with the pre-
dictions when a hub-and-spoke effect within countries is introduced in the 
simulation model. For Central Europe, one possibility is that capital region 
effects eliminate the east-west patterns of growth observed in Figures 3-5, 
and expected according to the SPATIAL scenario. If this is true, the story 
                                                 
19 Redding and Sturm (2005) analysed Germany and concluded that unification promoted 
growth in the border regions between West and East Germany. We find an eastern gradi-
ent for West Germany but no western gradient for East Germany. Potentially, the unifica-
tion effect observed could be linked to the alternative mechanism discussed here and not 
the impact of unification.  
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is that integration drives growth in Central Europe, but the benefits accrue 
disproportionately to the capitals, due to the hub-and-spoke pattern.  
Another possible interpretation of the results for Central Europe is 
that different reforms have opposite impact on east-west trends so in sume, 
these cancel out. In Table 2, two of the scenarios (WIDER and WTO) pre-
dict a western gradient of growth across regions in Central Europe, 
whereas SPATIAL predicts an eastern gradient. The relative strength of 
either mechanism will then determine the outcome. In this perspective it 
may not be surprising that the east-west effects are weak and varying. In 
addition to the non-significant results in most cases, we find one border 
case with an eastern gradient (the Czech Republic), and two with a western 
gradient (Greece and Romania.  
For Romania, this is in line with the results of Crozet and Koenig-
Soubeyran (2004) who interpreted their results as indicating that proximity 
to the EU market would promote growth. In our framework, this corre-
sponds to the WIDER scenario. Observe however that for Romania, there 
is an eastern gradient for population change and this seems to be driving 
the differences in GDP per capita growth. Hence higher income per capita 
growth in western Romania is not mainly because of high GDP growth, 
but because of more population decline in Western Romania. This sug-
gests that the western gradient for income per capita in Romania may be 
explained by features not captured by our models.20 Hence it is possible 
that the trend in Romania is due to transition rather than integration. 
Turning finally to the eastern countries, we observe  
 
- a north-eastern gradient of growth in Turkey;  
- a capital region effect and a southern growth gradient for Ukraine; and 
- growth away from the economic central point in Russia.  
 
For Russia and Ukraine, the results on population growth are however 
stronger than results with per capita income as dependent variable, in-
creasing adjusted R2 from 0.10 to 0.48 for Russia, and from 0.27 to 0.51-
0.59 for Ukraine. In Russia, population decline is lower in the south-west 
direction. Along with Andrienko and Guriev (2004), we find that popula-
tion development in Russia is more favourable for regions with a higher 
initial income level (see Table A6). For Russia, it is also evident that the 
growth pattern is affected by the natural resources and oil prices.21 In 
Ukraine, there is a western gradient for population growth, due to faster 
population decline in the east of the country.  
The results for Eastern Europe do not provide convincing support 
for any of our model scenarios, and a possible interpretation is that in 
Eastern Europe, transition effects still dominate so the “invisible hand” of 
                                                 
20 East-west gradients for income per capita and population growth have opposite signs 
also for Spain, West Germany and the Czech Republic. For West Germany and Spain, 
there was higher population growth rather than less decline in areas with more income 
growth. From Table A6 in the Appendix, we find that population growth was higher in 
regions with initially higher income in the following cases: Czech Republic, Spain, 
France, Italy, Russia and Turkey. Hence in these countries, there was migration driven by 
income gaps. 
21 It would be appropriate to take this into account in the econometric analysis but in 
order to limit the length of this paper we leave this task for further research.  
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economic geography is still weak. One might interpret the north-east gra-
dient of per capita growth in Turkey as evidence of an “agglomeration 
shadow” but we consider this as quite uncertain unless we obtain more 
systematic evidence to this effect. Hence on the whole, the results do not 
confirm the presence of an “agglomeration shadow” to the east.  
 
5. Summing up: A revised model scenario 
 
Throughout the empirical analysis, the model scenarios have helped us 
interpret the results. We have found evidence providing some support for 
the model predictions, but the pattern is complex, varying and we cannot 
declare a clear “winner”. This is as it should: The world is complex, and 
economics should address this complexity rather than search for simple 
“universal laws” that may turn out to be evasive. 
 The empirical results suggest that elements from different model 
scenarios are relevant: The SPATIAL predictions are supported for West-
ern Europe but for Central Europe, the pattern is more ambiguous. As a 
tentative summing-up of the analysis, we construct a “hybrid” model sce-
nario which captures some of the observed empirical regularities. Depart-
ing from the WEST scenario, we add the following elements: 
 
- East-West integration as before, according to the WIDER scenario. 
- Hub-and-spoke patterns in all Central and Eastern European countries: 
Half the trade of each region has to be shipped via the capitals. This 
creates a “capital effect” in each country, in line with the regression re-
sults.  
- A reduction in spatial trade costs that is different in the three areas: 
50% reduction within W1-W4, and 25% reduction for the trade be-
tween C1 and C2, and their trade with the western countries. For the 
eastern countries, there is no reduction in the cost of distance. The mo-
tivation for this pattern is that such a reduction is caused by the internal 
market, and integration is therefore deeper in the Western area. Mone-
tary integration could also add to this effect. 
 
Combining these elements, Figure 11 shows the result, measured by the 
real wage change from the WEST scenario. As before, we show the out-
come along the 5th latitude. 
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Figure 11: A combined scenario:
Real wage change from WEST scenario
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Here we have reproduced  
 
- the U-shape in Western Europe, due to deeper “spatial liberalisation” 
in the west;  
- the “skewed U-shape” from the real-world Figure 4b, with higher 
growth in Central Europe, due to the impact of wider integration; 
- a strong capital effect in Central Europe, but no clear East-West differ-
ence inside the countries, due to the hub-and-spoke effects. 
 
Hence for West and Central Europe, this hybrid scenario reproduces the 
main observed pattern.  
In the eastern country E1 there is a U-shaped pattern with zero 
growth in the capital region (on longitude 11), but decline elsewhere and 
more so in the east. As noted above, the empirical evidence for Ukraine, 
Turkey and Russia is more mixed so we cannot draw a clear conclusion 
concerning the relevance of the model predictions. For Russia, population 
changes and the observed CORE effect are in line with Figure 11. How-
ever, correcting for natural resource income is necessary before we can 
draw firm conclusions about spatial effects in Russia. An extended analy-
sis (which will not be undertaken here) is required for this purpose.   
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
In the paper, we have shown that along the east-west axis in Europe, there 
has been a sharp U- or V-shaped pattern of growth differentials across 
European regions, with the lowest growth at a longitude through West 
Germany and Italy, and higher growth to the west and to the east of this. 
We have used numerical model simulation and econometric analysis in 
order to explain this pattern, and our tentative assessment of the results is 
as follows:  
 
- In Western Europe, the east-west gradients of growth apply similarly 
inside as well as across countries, in line with the observed U-pattern. 
A possible explanation is that the implementation of the EU internal 
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market during the period has implied institutional harmonisation across 
European countries in a way that has reduced the “cost of distance” 
and made Europe smaller. Given the complexity of the internal market 
reform, we expect that its strongest effect should be in Western 
Europe. After 2000, stronger growth in eastern parts of the EU-15 
could also be driven by east-west integration. Monetary integration 
could also be a driving force for Western Europe. 
- For Central Europe, the U-pattern of growth differences applies across 
countries but not within them, and we find spatial east-west gradients 
of regional growth within countries only in a few cases. On the other 
hand there are strong capital region effects in all the countries covered 
by the analysis. Hence one possible explanation is that gains from inte-
gration accrue disproportionately to capitals, and this wipes out any 
east-west impact inside Central European countries. Another possible 
explanation is that reduced distance costs and wider regional integra-
tion have opposite impacts on regional growth, and this is why the net 
impact is weak or missing.  
- The Eastern European countries Ukraine and Russia are more remote 
and this may be a reason we do not find strong east-west gradients of 
income growth in these countries. We find a westward gradient of 
population change (due to less population decline in the west), but we 
interpret this as an effect of transition and not linked to the mecha-
nisms studied in the model approach we have used. A north-east gradi-
ent of per capita income growth in Turkey could in principle be inter-
preted as evidence on an “agglomeration shadow” or even reduced 
distance costs, but with so limited evidence we are not able to draw 
clear conclusions on this. 
 
In the paper, we have combined descriptive analysis, model simulation and 
econometrics in order to shed light on the economic geography of Europe. 
Many of the results, theoretically as well as empirically, are new.  
 
- To our knowledge, the U-shaped pattern of growth along Europe’s 
east-west axis has not been fully examined by earlier research.  
- Through model simulations, we have shown that different trade re-
forms may have very different effects on the spatial distribution of in-
come. Using higher-dimensional numerical modelling, we have devel-
oped tools for examining such reforms and deriving more precise hy-
potheses for empirical work and interpretation of the results. Instead of 
looking for “general laws” about spatial change, predictions are spe-
cific and not universal. 
- Using the Harris (1954) concept of market potential, it has often been 
assumed that proximity to markets is an advantage for growth. We 
have shown, theoretically and empirically, that this is the case some-
times but not generally. A possible extension of the analysis could be 
to derive these implications for the market potential concept. 
- The EU internal market was established during in the early 1990s but 
its implementation is gradual and its full impact has not been meas-
ured. Our results suggest, as one possible explanation which should be 
examined further with more specific evidence, that the internal market 
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has had a massive impact on the economic geography of Europe, espe-
cially Western Europe, by “making Europe smaller”.  
- It is not new that European integration has promoted growth in Central 
Europe, but the analysis sheds new light on the (partly missing) re-
gional impact of this inside countries as well as the role of capital re-
gions in Central and Eastern Europe; comprehensively for most of the 
countries involved.   
- While earlier research has analysed the extent of overall regional ine-
quality within countries, inequality measures such as Gini or Theil in-
dexes, or growth regressions, are insensitive to the geographical di-
mensions of inequality. The results here provide a mapping of east-
west and north-south gradients of economic growth and population 
change across European countries. 
 
In the theoretical as well as the empirical work undertaken in the paper, a 
limitation is that the impact of global competition has not been accounted 
for. The relative economic decline of the former powerhouses of Europe, 
in Germany and Italy, could also be affected by competition from e.g. 
Asia, and in further research this should be examined further. In the ana-
lysis, we have also drawn tentative conclusions based on resemblance of 
macro-simulations and empirical results. For example, we have shown that 
the pattern of growth in Western Europe conforms with the SPATIAL sce-
nario but we have presented no direct evidence showing that the cost of 
distance has actually been reduced. Because of this, all our main conclusi-
ons are tentative and should be underpinned by further research providing 
more specific evidence. Nevertheless, we believe that such a macro-based 
approach is necessary, at least as a starting point, is necessary if we are to 
capture the “invisible hands” operating on the economic geography of 
Europe. European integration is the sum of thousands of reforms and regu-
lations, and a birds-eye view is necessary in order to trace the combined 
impact of all these reforms. The bird should however not fly in too thin air, 
and through our modelling approach we have attempted to develop a “geo-
graphical economics” approach with sufficient specificity for the empirical 
analysis. 
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Figure A1: Longitudes of European countries
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Figure A2: WIDER: Nominal wage changes 
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Figure A3: SPATIAL: Nominal wage changes
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Figure A4: WTO: Nominal wage changes
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Table A1: Data coverage 
Countries Years covered 
Classifi-
cation Data source Notes 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, UK 
(18 countries) 
1995-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio 
- France: Overseas territories dropped. 
- Spain: Canary and Balearic Islands dropped. 
- Portugal: Ceuta, Melilla dropped. 
- Germany: Sachsen-Anhalt missing. 
- Germany: Split in West and East in some of the analysis. 
- UK: No data for “Highlands and Islands”. 
- A few other regions dropped due to missing data: Belgium 
2, Germany 1, Italy 8, Netherlands 2, UK 2. 
Bulgaria, Latvia 1996-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Estonia 1997-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Poland 1995-2005 NUTS 2 Eurostat/Regio NUTS3 data limited, NUTS2 data are used 
Romania 1998-2005 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Croatia 1995-2000 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Norway 1995 and 1997-2005 NUTS 3 
Eurostat/Regio 
Statistics Norway 
Nation-level GDP data from Regio but regional allocation is 
calculated using regional GDP data from Statistics Norway 
Turkey 1995-2001 NUTS 3 Eurostat/Regio  
Russia 1995-2005 National Rosstat Annual publications: Russian regions 
Ukraine 1996-2005 National SSCU State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland    Regional data not available from Eurostat 
Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, 
Liechtenstein    Not included in analysis 
Note: For more information about the number and size of regions etc., see Melchior (2008a). On NUTS classification, see Eurostat (2007). 
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Table A2: Correlations between spatial variables 
Variables:  
• LON: Longitude of regions at levels (at NUTS3 level, except for Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine where NUTS2 or national classification has been used). 
• LAT: Latitude 
• CAP: Distance from region centre point to country capital. For West Germany, 
Bonn has been used. 
• DEC: Distance to the country’s economic centre point, measured as GDP-weighted 
average of regional coordinates. 
In the table, standard Pearson correlations are reported, with P values below estimate. 
The number of observations is as in Tables A4 and A5. 
 
 LON-LAT 
LON-
CAP 
LON-
DEC 
LAT-
CAP 
LAT-
DEC 
CAP-
DEC 
Austria 0.39 -0.98 -0.74 -0.54 -0.32 0.77 
  0.0202 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 0.0601 <.0001 
Belgium -0.51 0.13 0.14 -0.48 -0.53 1.00 
  0.0006 0.4021 0.3695 0.0015 0.0003 <.0001 
Bulgaria 0.21 0.95 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.53 
  0.2928 <.0001 0.0819 0.1294 0.1110 0.0035 
Czech Republic -0.32 0.74 -0.01 -0.47 -0.10 0.56 
  0.2571 0.0023 0.9650 0.0936 0.7248 0.0358 
Germany -0.27 0.82 0.37 -0.17 0.06 0.79 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0013 0.2725 <.0001 
Germany East -0.27 -0.32 -0.38 -0.19 0.30 0.86 
  0.0293 0.0078 0.0015 0.1201 0.0132 <.0001 
Estonia 0.04 0.71 0.60 -0.59 -0.43 0.86 
  0.9515 0.1797 0.2879 0.2924 0.4678 0.0643 
Spain 0.03 0.12 -0.39 -0.05 -0.13 0.83 
  0.8554 0.4093 0.0061 0.7520 0.3975 <.0001 
Finland 0.17 0.34 0.27 0.97 0.86 0.90 
  0.4900 0.1593 0.2568 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
France -0.15 0.20 0.13 -0.90 -0.59 0.84 
  0.1487 0.0486 0.2214 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Greece -0.25 0.13 0.44 0.32 -0.16 0.85 
  0.0812 0.3586 0.0014 0.0234 0.2738 <.0001 
Croatia -0.08 0.38 0.35 -0.84 -0.69 0.93 
  0.7243 0.0924 0.1156 <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 
Hungary 0.39 0.04 -0.01 -0.25 -0.11 0.98 
  0.0890 0.8542 0.9622 0.2960 0.6584 <.0001 
Ireland 0.19 -0.95 -0.62 -0.26 0.02 0.73 
  0.6522 0.0003 0.0998 0.5295 0.9617 0.0392 
Italy -0.73 -0.23 0.51 0.09 -0.71 0.56 
 <.0001 0.0199 <.0001 0.3513 <.0001 <.0001 
Lithuania -0.30 -0.93 -0.39 0.55 0.34 0.48 
 0.3941 <.0001 0.2611 0.0973 0.3377 0.1564 
Latvia -0.11 0.42 0.25 -0.24 -0.22 0.98 
 0.8403 0.4116 0.6272 0.6421 0.6730 0.0007 
Netherlands 0.49 0.58 0.55 -0.09 0.30 0.85 
 0.0019 0.0002 0.0003 0.6050 0.0719 <.0001 
Norway 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.94 0.87 0.97 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Poland -0.19 -0.74 0.01 -0.06 0.31 0.46 
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 LON-LAT 
LON-
CAP 
LON-
DEC 
LAT-
CAP 
LAT-
DEC 
CAP-
DEC 
 0.4836 0.0011 0.9834 0.8350 0.2378 0.0740 
Portugal 0.21 0.53 0.28 0.75 0.04 0.57 
 0.2874 0.0038 0.1566 <.0001 0.8580 0.0014 
Romania -0.16 -0.52 -0.18 0.80 0.27 0.63 
 0.3162 0.0004 0.2635 <.0001 0.0801 <.0001 
Russia -0.03 0.97 0.83 -0.14 -0.14 0.88 
 0.7930 <.0001 <.0001 0.2203 0.2247 <.0001 
Sweden 0.52 0.04 0.36 0.46 0.65 0.92 
 0.0153 0.8707 0.1059 0.0351 0.0014 <.0001 
Slovenia 0.60 0.59 0.13 0.54 0.21 0.83 
 0.0401 0.0437 0.6941 0.0683 0.5137 0.0008 
Slovakia 0.53 1.00 0.65 0.61 0.28 0.62 
 0.1721 <.0001 0.0839 0.1081 0.5002 0.1020 
Turkey -0.13 0.76 0.85 -0.16 -0.15 0.99 
 0.2633 <.0001 <.0001 0.1469 0.1991 <.0001 
United Kingdom -0.43 -0.78 -0.57 0.86 0.55 0.78 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Ukraine -0.30 0.26 -0.55 -0.64 0.02 0.50 
 0.1224 0.1849 0.0029 0.0004 0.9367 0.0073 
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Table A3: Correlation between initial income (y0) and other variables  
Note: P values below estimate. Number of observations as in Table A4.  
Country LON LAT CAP CORE 
Austria -0.30 0.04 0.22 0.26 
  0.0782 0.8112 0.2072 0.1353 
Belgium -0.09 0.36 -0.35 -0.36 
  0.5497 0.0190 0.0240 0.0195 
Bulgaria -0.15 -0.07 -0.28 -0.12 
  0.4429 0.7246 0.1496 0.5508 
Czech Republic -0.23 0.11 -0.53 -0.25 
  0.4320 0.7204 0.0534 0.3810 
Germany -0.21 -0.23 0.11 0.09 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0254 0.0713 
Germany West 0.00 -0.14 0.01 0.00 
  0.9711 0.0084 0.8366 0.9694 
Germany East 0.01 0.07 -0.22 -0.18 
  0.9251 0.5770 0.0704 0.1557 
Spain 0.62 0.58 -0.05 -0.38 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.7344 0.0080 
Finland -0.22 -0.39 -0.40 -0.07 
  0.3553 0.0996 0.0886 0.7772 
France 0.03 0.25 -0.35 -0.22 
  0.7707 0.0142 0.0005 0.0306 
Greece 0.11 -0.16 -0.37 -0.32 
  0.4227 0.2719 0.0067 0.0217 
Hungary -0.33 -0.06 -0.36 -0.31 
  0.1493 0.7987 0.1144 0.1896 
Italy -0.75 0.86 0.11 -0.66 
 <.0001 <.0001 0.2957 <.0001 
Netherlands -0.31 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
 0.0610 0.3729 0.3781 0.3790 
Norway -0.16 -0.24 -0.28 -0.20 
 0.5125 0.3213 0.2396 0.4150 
Poland -0.50 0.08 0.03 -0.26 
 0.0503 0.7806 0.9061 0.3247 
Portugal -0.57 -0.46 -0.53 -0.06 
 0.0016 0.0146 0.0039 0.7432 
Romania -0.12 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 
 0.4591 0.2321 0.2487 0.2846 
Russia 0.29 0.53 0.22 0.12 
 0.0092 <.0001 0.0551 0.2833 
Sweden 0.23 0.21 -0.07 0.14 
 0.3259 0.3515 0.7634 0.5593 
Turkey -0.68 0.13 -0.51 -0.57 
 <.0001 0.2551 <.0001 <.0001 
United Kingdom 0.23 -0.13 -0.26 -0.13 
 0.0087 0.1524 0.0039 0.1451 
Ukraine 0.53 0.21 -0.36 -0.61 
 0.0043 0.2944 0.0649 0.0008 
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Table A4: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional growth in GDP per capita, Europe 1995-2005 
- Equation A: Distance to capitals and economic centre points in logs (equation (2) in the main text). 
- Equation B: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points (equation (3) in the main text). 
- Equation C: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points and quadratic terms added (equation (4) in the main text). 
- Regressions are for change between first and last years during 1995-2005 except for A2 and C2, which are for the last half of this period (2000-2005). 
- Robust regressions are reported where they affect conclusions about the significance level of estimates. For robust regressions R2 is reported. 
 
Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
Austria C Est. 36.9 0.09 -0.70     -0.0109 0.0000 0.19 35 
  P values 0.0013 0.3985 0.0039     0.0552 0.0645   
Belgium A Est. -11.0 -0.22 0.34 0.77 -1.22     0.28 42 
  P values 0.5414 0.1046 0.3152 0.1043 0.0505       
Bulgaria A Est. 1.5 0.29 0.00 -0.63      -0.02 28 
  P values 0.9467 0.3552 0.9953 0.1317        
 A2 Est. 44.5 0.26 -0.93 -0.89      0.16 28 
  P values 0.0822 0.4647 0.1186 0.0611        
Czech Rep. C Est. 380.1 25.34 -15.03   -0.0410 -0.0026  0.0027 0.86 14 
  P values 0.0104 0.0174 0.0142   <.0001 0.0212  0.0183   
Germany A Est. 5.1 0.21 -0.05 0.16 -0.40     0.12 414 
  P values 0.0709 <.0001 0.1780 0.2930 0.0004       
West Germany B Est. 6.8 0.18 -0.10     -0.0023  0.13 348 
  P values 0.0001 <.0001 0.0035     0.0002    
East Germany A Est. 4.0 -0.16 0.04 0.86 -0.88     0.08 66 
  P values 0.6498 0.4076 0.7979 0.0063 0.0324       
 A robust Est. 8.10 -0.09 -0.13 0.34 0.34     0.10 66 
  P values 0.3184 0.6212 0.3493 0.2372 0.3614       
Spain A Est. 5.1 -0.03 -0.06  0.49     0.41 47 
  P values 0.0009 0.2108 0.0609  <.0001       
 C2 Est. 3.6 -0.24 -0.01     0.0062 0.0000 0.50 47 
  P values 0.0866 <.0001 0.7725     0.0627 0.1296   
Finland C Est. 2.1 -0.07 0.07     -0.0028  0.07 19 
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Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
  P values 0.8556 0.4060 0.6932     0.2817    
France A Est. 8.5 -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 0.17     0.21 96 
  P values <.0001 0.0082 0.0002 0.0787 0.0995       
 A robust Est. 7.9000 -0.0400 -0.0900 -0.0800 0.1600     0.20 96 
  P values <.0001 0.0090 0.0007 0.1706 0.1242       
Greece B Est. -18.4 -0.50 0.89   -0.0429  0.0446  0.10 51 
  P values 0.1734 0.0378 0.0360   0.0066  0.0058    
Croatia A Est. 93.7 -0.57 -1.75 -0.78 0.96     0.35 21 
  P values 0.0054 0.1627 0.0096 0.1422 0.3702       
Hungary B Est. 40.4 0.17 -0.78   -0.1084  0.1020  0.43 20 
  P values 0.4412 0.6255 0.5228   0.0673  0.0947    
Italy B Est. 5.6 0.13 -0.10   0.0018  -0.0021  0.16 99 
  P values 0.0401 0.0022 0.0908   0.1010  0.0696    
Netherlands C Est. -2714.9 -21.88 54.15   0.0175 0.0071 -0.0227 -0.0070 0.00 38 
  P values 0.0711 0.0717 0.0706   0.1626 0.0712 0.1087 0.0727   
Norway A Est. 1.4 -0.05 0.14 -0.12 -0.28     -0.10 19 
  P values 0.8430 0.5033 0.3079 0.4687 0.4044       
 A robust Est. 11.70 0.07 -0.11 0.32 -0.39     0.17 19 
  P values 0.1095 0.4253 0.4285 0.0673 0.2725       
Poland A robust Est. 8.0 -0.04 0.04 -0.55 -0.16     0.26 16 
  P values 0.4184 0.6922 0.8038 0.0035 0.6052       
Portugal C Est. -6522.3 65.81 180.84   0.0115 -0.0081  0.0080 0.03 28 
  P values 0.0515 0.0502 0.0513   0.2427 0.0510  0.0511   
Romania A Est. 5.2 -0.59 0.50 -1.11 -0.13     0.26 42 
  P values 0.7153 0.0007 0.1198 0.0039 0.8343       
Russia A Est. 20.4 0.01 0.05 -0.56 1.00     0.07 79 
  P values 0.0008 0.3893 0.4401 0.0514 0.0708       
Sweden A Est. 5.0 0.01 -0.02 -0.25 0.18     0.15 21 
  P values 0.0531 0.8740 0.7203 0.0328 0.3526       
Turkey C Est. -258.8 5.58 2.10   -0.0139 0.0005 0.0134 -0.0005 0.27 79 
  P values 0.0097 0.0147 0.0023   0.3301 0.0161 0.3375 0.0163   
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Country Equation  Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CAP2 CORE CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
UK A Est. 8.1 -0.10  -0.44 -0.27     0.08 126 
  P values <.0001 0.2761  0.0069 0.1151       
Ukraine A Est. 52.3 0.14 -0.75 -1.15 1.52     0.18 27 
  P values 0.0371 0.3538 0.0749 0.0110 0.1775       
 A robust Est. 39.9 0.1 -0.57 0.19 0.96     0.24  
  P values 0.0159 0.3344 0.044 0.5037 0.2125       
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Table A5: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional growth in GDP per capita, Europe 1995-2005. 
OLS regressions including initial income. 
- Equation A: Distance to capitals and economic centre points in logs (eguation (2) in the main text). 
- Equation C: Linear distances to capitals and economic centre points and quadratic terms added (equation (4) in the main text). 
 
Country Eq.  Constant ln(y0) LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CORE CAP2 CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
Austria C Est. 40.3 -0.56 0.05 -0.64    -1.06  0.28 0.20 35 
  P values 0.0007 0.2246 0.6031 0.0077    0.0594  0.0674   
Belgium A Est. -8.6 0.37 -2.39 2.27 0.93 -1.36     0.27 42 
  P values 0.6411 0.4636 0.0904 0.5493 0.0781 0.0392       
Bulgaria A Est. 40.7 -5.24 6.30 -0.12 -1.46      0.17 28 
  P values 0.1156 0.0182 0.0514 0.9798 0.0066        
Czech Rep. C Est. 388.3 -0.18 258.05 -153.07   -4.23 0.58 -26.5 27.20 0.82 14 
  P values 0.0260 0.8878 0.0376 0.0321   0.0044 0.7254 0.0440 0.0397   
 A Est. 83.6 -4.39 1.97 -7.27 -1.26      0.71  
  P values 0.0347 0.1096 0.0933 0.0554 0.0044        
Germany A Est. 15.8 -0.73 0.88 -1.09 0.28 -0.45     0.16 414 
  P values <.0001 <.0001 0.0011 0.0004 0.0033 0.0002       
West Germany A Est. 16.0 -0.64 1.14 -1.28 0.16 -0.40     0.16 348 
  P values <.0001 <.0001 0.0137 <.0001 0.2159 0.0008       
East Germany A Est. 15.6 -1.19 -1.72 0.41 0.75 -0.87     0.11 66 
  P values 0.1697 0.1118 0.3766 0.7742 0.0189 0.0333       
Spain A Est. -0.2 0.72 -0.61 -1.02 -0.03 0.54     0.41 47 
  P values 0.9700 0.2758 0.1459 0.0463 0.7266 <.0001       
 A Est. -0.9 0.82 -0.68 -1.08  0.52     0.42  
  P values 0.8371 0.1669 0.0637 0.0235  <.0001       
Finland A Est. 41.0 -3.16 -0.85 -0.35 -0.35      0.26 19 
  P values 0.0127 0.0317 0.2333 0.7471 0.0669        
France C Est. 3.5 0.40 -0.55 -0.69    -0.12  0.03 0.24 96 
  P values 0.1289 0.0791 0.0011 0.0075    0.2535  0.0583   
Greece A Est. 35.7 -2.74 -0.15 -1.35 -1.10 0.98     0.14 51 
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Country Eq.  Constant ln(y0) LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) CAP CORE CAP2 CORE2 Adj. R2 N 
  P values 0.0549 0.0726 0.9305 0.4454 0.0158 0.2554       
Hungary C Est. -24.4 0.07 -3.27 8.19   -5.01  1.74  0.47 20 
  P values 0.4357 0.9620 0.1288 0.1417   0.0219  0.0478    
Italy C Est. 11.2 -1.51 0.67 1.38    -0.40  0.05 0.20 99 
  P values 0.0128 0.0075 0.0702 0.0499    0.0108  0.0229   
Netherlands C Est. -2836.1 0.56 -227.57 564.48   1.83 -2.07 73.90 -73.20 -0.02 38 
  P values 0.0631 0.4387 0.0645 0.0631   0.1494 0.1511 0.0637 0.0647   
Norway A Est. -6.5 0.94 -0.30 1.09  -0.40     -0.06 19 
  P values 0.5813 0.3137 0.6660 0.3376  0.1961       
Poland A Est. 17.4 -0.82 -1.22 0.37 -0.62 -0.16     0.43 16 
  P values 0.5481 0.7452 0.4681 0.8077 0.0338 0.5215       
 A Est. 19.6 -0.99 -1.39 0.15 -0.65      0.46  
  P values 0.4846 0.6875 0.3947 0.9168 0.0196        
Portugal A Est. 30.3 -1.72 1.45 -2.05 -0.17      0.03 28 
  P values 0.0204 0.0859 0.7276 0.2496 0.4426        
Romania A Est. -7.4 1.34 -5.40 4.82 -0.97 -0.02     0.26 42 
  P values 0.7126 0.3647 0.0030 0.1394 0.0165 0.9727       
 A Est. -7.5 1.34 -5.39 4.81 -0.98      0.28  
  P values 0.6941 0.3462 0.0026 0.1338 0.0144        
Russia C Est. 14.8 1.41 -0.55 0.06   0.20 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.10 79 
  P values 0.0307 0.1361 0.2641 0.9465   0.0938 0.7193 0.1225 0.0480   
Sweden A Est. 26.1 -2.23 -0.23 0.02 -0.40 0.33     0.13 21 
  P values 0.3279 0.4251 0.8012 0.9702 0.0765 0.2306       
Turkey C Est. -196.5 -1.17 44.15 17.10   -1.23 1.31 4.33 -4.32 0.29 79 
  P values 0.0371 0.0680 0.0399 0.0081   0.3611 0.3188 0.0400 0.0397   
UK C Est. -4.5 0.26 -2.31 1.49   -1.00  0.08  0.09 126 
  P values 0.6594 0.6152 0.1278 0.4477   0.0113  0.0593    
 C Est. 12.0 0.59 0.53 -2.30    -0.85  0.19 0.07  
  P values 0.1027 0.2375 0.5512 0.0166    0.0429  0.0483   
Ukraine C Est. -1.8 7.88 -3.48 -4.01   -2.39  0.44  0.27 27 
  P values 0.9520 0.0435 0.0969 0.3873   0.0341  0.0068    
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Table A6: Country-level regressions on spatial determinants of regional change in population, Europe 1995-2005 
Dependent variable: Population change 1995-2005, or closest available years. 
 
 Constant term Longitude Latitude Dist. to capital Dist. to ec. centre Initial per capita income 
 Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) y0 ln(y0) 
 Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value 
Adj. R2 N 
Austria 1.792 0.8431 -0.184 0.0073 0.048 0.7918 -0.258 0.0351       0.14 35 
 -6.077 0.5618 -0.111 0.1771 0.061 0.7344 -0.153 0.2679     0.589 0.1573 0.17  
Belgium -4.279 0.5014 0.192 0.0003 0.072 0.5490 -0.211 0.2047 0.248 0.2496     0.30 42 
 -0.101 0.9860 0.179 0.0005 -0.008 0.9457 -0.006 0.9151   0.006 0.5507   0.28  
Bulgaria -2.017 0.7867 0.298 0.0084 -0.106 0.5446 -0.439 0.0037       0.24 28 
 -7.771 0.4167 0.248 0.0428 -0.104 0.5533 -0.317 0.0980     0.768 0.3334 0.24  
Czech Rep. -0.923 0.8422 -0.059 0.0687 0.031 0.7289 0.043 0.2406       0.14 14 
 6.206 0.0574 -0.033 0.0771 -0.062 0.2601 -0.233 0.0033   -0.160 0.0008   0.74  
W. Germany 2.252 0.0145 -0.053 0.0332 -0.064 0.0002 0.032 0.6360 0.288 <.0001     0.09 348 
 2.961 0.0022 -0.069 0.0066 -0.060 0.0007 0.180 0.0030   -0.003 0.4207   0.04  
E. Germany 3.751 0.5756 -0.331 0.0303 0.074 0.5036 -0.110 0.6411 -0.699 0.0270     0.16 66 
 7.472 0.2748 -0.319 0.0409 -0.006 0.9550 -0.572 0.0019   -0.066 0.1406   0.13  
Spain 8.968 0.0002 0.178 <.0001 -0.159 0.0017 -0.040 0.7472 -0.187 0.3302     0.43 47 
 -9.668 0.1847 0.075 0.1892 -0.296 0.0001 0.022 0.8432     2.381 0.0133 0.50  
Finland 2.005 0.7442 -0.037 0.4985 0.022 0.8493 -0.234 0.0494 -0.246 0.4396     0.37 19 
 -6.513 0.5240 -0.050 0.3127 -0.050 0.5099 -0.119 0.3465     1.198 0.2143 0.40  
France 3.443 0.0143 -0.017 0.2161 -0.092 0.0001 -0.106 0.0320 0.347 0.0001     0.32 96 
 -5.404 0.0912 -0.026 0.0657 -0.090 0.0002 0.113 0.0649     0.990 0.0002 0.32  
Greece 0.532 0.7428 -0.009 0.7713 -0.032 0.3373 -0.124 0.1488 0.347 0.0178     0.08 51 
 0.068 0.9826 0.012 0.6967 -0.042 0.2413 0.032 0.6422     0.146 0.5807 -0.03  
Hungary -8.339 0.2873 -0.045 0.4845 0.248 0.1589 0.661 0.0010 -1.202 0.0014     0.42 20 
 -1.306 0.8974 -0.093 0.2821 0.107 0.6157 -0.150 0.3268   -0.207 0.0426   0.12  
Italy -1.199 0.3294 -0.006 0.7720 0.058 0.0086 -0.011 0.8357 -0.156 0.0182     0.30 99 
 -11.766 <.0001 0.028 0.1850 -0.012 0.6553 -0.018 0.6880     1.270 <.0001 0.39  
Netherlands -1.299 0.9156 0.129 0.4874 0.040 0.8691 -0.066 0.6780 -0.166 0.3274     -0.05 38 
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 Constant term Longitude Latitude Dist. to capital Dist. to ec. centre Initial per capita income 
 Const. LON LAT ln(CAP) ln(CORE) y0 ln(y0) 
 Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value Est. P value 
Adj. R2 N 
 1.221 0.9219 0.118 0.5338 -0.012 0.9619 -0.140 0.3611   -0.009 0.8013   -0.08  
Norway 6.483 0.0601 0.006 0.8790 -0.109 0.0925 -0.141 0.0887 0.250 0.1297     0.50 19 
 0.233 0.9733 0.040 0.3476 -0.140 0.0762 0.020 0.8765     0.847 0.2914 0.46  
Poland -1.624 0.5188 -0.007 0.7867 0.027 0.5399 -0.062 0.2079 0.105 0.1887     0.02 16 
 -0.986 0.7914 -0.018 0.7323 0.035 0.4679 -0.071 0.4035   -0.047 0.7270   -0.14  
Portugal -8.140 0.0471 -1.121 <.0001 -0.064 0.4772 0.225 0.0624 0.144 0.3371     0.49 28 
 -8.036 0.0500 -1.010 0.0001 -0.046 0.6156 0.287 0.0357   0.052 0.3752   0.48  
Romania -7.175 0.0003 0.070 0.0014 0.112 0.0084 -0.033 0.4667       0.30 42 
 -7.506 0.0002 0.078 0.0007 0.106 0.0120 -0.002 0.9677   0.052 0.2136   0.31  
Russia 8.761 <.0001 -0.011 0.0160 -0.127 <.0001 -0.053 0.5794 -0.218 0.2369     0.43 79 
 8.376 <.0001 -0.018 <.0001 -0.158 <.0001 -0.021 0.8178   0.084 0.0045   0.48  
Sweden 4.494 0.0076 -0.005 0.9183 -0.060 0.0703 -0.171 0.0101       0.44 21 
 4.272 0.0215 -0.001 0.9885 -0.065 0.0890 -0.151 0.1043   0.021 0.7533   0.41  
Turkey 19.458 <.0001 -0.069 0.1483 -0.466 <.0001 -0.249 0.4506 0.577 0.3226     0.20 79 
 19.745 <.0001 0.034 0.3680 -0.544 <.0001 0.051 0.7715   0.263 0.0078   0.32  
UK 3.828 0.0180 -0.008 0.8146 -0.061 0.0808 -0.159 0.0243 0.086 0.1850     0.15 126 
 4.027 0.0154 -0.013 0.7147 -0.065 0.0820 -0.106 0.2518   0.010 0.3123   0.15  
Ukraine 2.478 0.2183 -0.047 0.0013 -0.050 0.1456 -0.122 0.0018 0.213 0.0284     0.59 27 
 4.447 0.0445 -0.070 0.0007 -0.062 0.1243 -0.079 0.0815   0.225 0.4193   0.51  
 
 
 
